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A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS

Paul J. RUTTEMAN *

PaulJ. Ruttentan focuses upon the accounting regulation experience of the EEC countrtes. Canada.
Japan and Australia, and how those experiences provide lessons for the U.S. accounting profession.
After poinung out the differences between the accountingstandards in these countries, Rutteman argues
that harmonizationof disparatenationalaccountingprinciples, ratherthan standardization.is the most
effective approach.
Drawing upon the EEC, difficulties with harmonizationare discussed. In particular,tre different
economic backgrounds of the member states and the different development of accountingstandardsare
highlighted as problems in harmonization.
Rutteman concludes that development of internationallyagreed upon accountingstandardsmust rely
upon adoption of broadprinciplesand, only later, enactment of specific "cookbook" rlesshould occur.

1. Introduction
When David Solomons called me at the end of September and asked me to
speak at the Arthur Young Professors' Roundtable, I was both delighted and
apprehensive. Delighted to be asked, apprehensive as to what I should say or
rather what I should leave out. Although David very kindly said that he was
not expecting a written paper, he was hoping for a thirty minute talk dealing
with how countries within the European Economic Community (EEC), Canada,
Japan, and Australia handle accounting regulations. Among other questions, I
was asked how the United States (U.S.) could learn from these experiences.
Moreover, I was asked to identify problems of cooperation between U.S.
regulatory agencies, especially the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and such international bodies as the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC) [1], the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Cutting that down to thirty
minutes is a tall order.
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2. The United Kingdom
Perhaps I had better start with the perspective. The EEC and particularly
the United Kingdom (U.K.) are the areas I know most about, so let me start
there. The EEC is a pretty diverse group of countries when it comes to
accounting regulations because their backgrounds are so different. At one end
of the spectrum is the UK, perhaps most similar to the U.S. in the sense of
having a large, highly-developed stock market and an accounting profession
which is large, well established and influential. In that its members include
nearly all finance directors in industry and commerce, practicing accountants
and auditors, as well as analysts and other users of financial reports, the British
accounting profession is well placed to be the natural promulgator of accounting standards. The U.K. common law system imparts a bias against unnecessary regulations by statute, a strong acceptance of judge-made law, however
outdated, and a preference for self-regulation.
Where the U.K. differs from the U.S. is that the U.K. has the City, the
square mile where all the main accountants, lawyers, bankers, and stockbrokers
know one another and keep up with the latest gossip [2]. It is a club where to
be a member you have to be a gentleman and if you behave badly, you are
ostracized. Such is the myth, and although times have changed, there is still an
element of truth in the story. It is the only way self-regulation works and
because the myth is dated we can see the cracks in the system. Rumor has it in
London that if the U.S. had only had one stock exchange, on Wall Street I
suppose, instead of eleven in 1933, the U.S. might never have had an SEC.
We tend to think of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 [3] as being based on the U.K. Companies Act of 1929 [4]. And, it is
today still the case that the Companies Act administered by the Department of
Trade and Industry represents the cornerstone of accounting regulations. But,
in accountancy terms, it regulates very little. It calls on all limited companies
to file audited accounts each year with the registrar of companies [5]. So,
900,000 companies must file their accounts with the Registrar each year. Those
accounts must contain certain specified disclosures. If there are subsidiary
companies, group accounts - usually consolidated accounts - must be filed
and they must show a true and fair view [6]. Until recently, that was a
reasonable summary of the requirements [7]. Companies and their auditors
exercised their judgment as to what constituted a true and fair view and the
same requirements applied to companies of all types - both large and small,
widely-held and director-controlled companies [8].
As the Economist observed in August 1969:
Accountants do not have nor do they believe in written rules. Apart from the information
and method of presentation required by the Companies Act, they rely on integrity and
common sense guided by the occasional statements issued by the various professional
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institutions. These carry none of the legal weight that similar recommendations from
institutions of American accountants do. They merely represent the evolving concept of
what constitutes "best practice" and the need to define this only arises when accountants
find themselves increasingly meeting situations that defeat their common sense [9].

Professor Edward Stamp, assisted by Sir Ronald Leach, the then President
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, must be
credited for subsequent changes. Professor Stamp wrote an article in The
Times in the aftermath of a scandal known as the Pergamon affair and a
celebrated takeover battle for a major engineering company [10]. He argued
that there was a proliferation of acceptable accounting principles in the U.K.
and, amongst other things, a more rapid evolution of accounting principles was
necessary [11]. He considered the possibility of a British SEC but concluded
that the degree of regulation which this would entail could well constitute a
cure worse than the disease [12].
As a result of that article, the English Institute set up an Accounting
Standards Steering Committee, later known as the Accounting Standards
Committee (ASC). We did not set up an SEC but the subject is still endlessly
discussed. The accounting standards produced by the ASC are generally
adhered to because the key professional institutes, and now all the U.K.
accountancy bodies, are members of the ASC and agree to require their
members to observe the standards or have good reasons for not doing so [131.
The Stock Exchange has given its support to the standards also, but the
sanctions in both cases are limited [14]. If standards are not observed, the
Institutes may call their members before their professional standards committees to explain their actions and auditors can be called to give an account of
themselves if they fail to qualify the accounts for any significant departure
from an accounting standard [151. The Stock Exchange can threaten to de-list a
company but, since it is The Stock Exchange's only effective sanction, it is
considered too draconian a measure to be used [16]. The weakness in U.K.
accounting regulation is the lack of a really effective means of enforcement.
Nevertheless, it is amazing how well the system works given these limitations.
As for the U.K. standards, they are more broadly drafted than their
counterparts in the U.S. For example, the U.S. Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 13 [17] on lease accounting is regarded in the
U.K. as a "cookbook rule" relying far too heavily on fixed percentages which
can readily be circumvented. Have you seen any finance lease accounting in
the U.S. recently or are they really all operating leases? The U.K. standard [18]
leaves more to the judgment of the preparer and auditor [19]. Guideline
percentages are given but the real test is whether the lease involves the transfer
of substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership.
To summarize the U.K. position, we have an admixture of disclosure-oriented public regulation - the "true and fair view" requirement - and of
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private sector regulation. The latter accounting standards are broader in style
than the U.S. counterparts and fewer in number, while presently covering the
most significant accounting areas, with the exception of pension costs. The
U.K. system of regulation is designed to apply to a wider range of companies
than in the U.S. All U.K. companies are regulated compared to just those
registered with the SEC in the U.S. [20]. The weakness lies in the ability to
enforce standards. More recently, industry pressure groups have exploited this
weakness in the U.K. system by suggesting that they should be exempted from
certain requirements because they would not comply anyway. In fairness, this
has been more of a threat than a practical problem. Nevertheless, it caused
embarrassment some years ago when Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)
declined to follow a U.K. standard on accounting for government capital
grants by insisting on using a flow-through approach when the standard
required a deferral of the income. Having received a qualified audit report, ICI
thereafter encountered difficulties when the SEC refused to allow the company
to raise money in the U.S. markets until ICI amended its accounting policies.
The irony is not just that it took the SEC to enforce U.K. standards but that,
in this particular case, the accounting method used by ICI was not in breach of
US principles under APB 4.

3. Holland
The accounting environment in Holland is similar to that in the U.K. in a
number of respects. There is a well-established stock market dominated by a
small number of multinational companies - Shell, Unilever, Philips, and
AKZO. The Dutch laws were broadly drafted until 1971; accounts were
required to follow good accounting practices, although such accounting practices were not defined [21]. The 1971 version is a little stronger but still very
general, much in the style of the U.K. Companies Act. To remedy that
deficiency, the Dutch government encouraged the formation of the Tripartite
body, comprising representatives of employer and employee organizations
together with the accounting profession [22]. In practice, the profession develops the papers for discussion by the Tripartite body and thereby assumes the
initiative in this area. This Tripartite approach reflects Dutch political thinking
in the post-war era.
Initially, the Tripartite body issued Considerations on the Law on the
Annual Financial Reports of Enterprises. The Tripartite body was set up to
take an inventory of generally adopted practice and consider the acceptability
of the different policies. It has since moved to firm up its observations into
guidance statements [23] - not yet mandatory, but at least strongly persuasive
[24]. Once more, there is no statutory backing for their work and accountants
are still very much encouraged to use their judgment- The very international
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nature of large Dutch companies has caused Dutch accountants to look at
acceptable practices elsewhere in determining what is acceptable in Holland.
The result is that there are normally very few surprises for British and
American readers, although there is greater emphasis on current values than in
the U.S. [25]. That has long been the case since Professor Limperg's influence.
The "business economic" approach rather than "cookbook rules" would
summarize the Dutch outlook.
Although the Tripartite body's statements are the equivalent of accounting
standards in the U.S. and U.K., there are two other sources of accounting
regulation: the Act on Annual Financial Reports of Enterprises, already
referred to and only very broad in its requirements, and the Enterprise
Chamber, a special chamber of the Court of Justice at Amsterdam [261. The
Enterprise Chamber rules on charges of failure to comply with the Act on
Annual Financial Reports [27]. Charges can be brought only by parties - not
just shareholders, but employees and trade unions as well - with a direct
interest in the financial statements of the company under investigation and the
verdict of the court applies only to the specific case under investigation [28].
Nevertheless, these verdicts give rise to considerable discussion within the
profession. Indeed, they have been known to contradict the requirements of
the guidelines issued by the Tripartite body and to that extent undermine the
status of those guidelines. Strangely, however, the court can impose few
sanctions. If the financial statements are found not to comply with the law, the
court can order the management to correct them. Only if they are not corrected
can further action be taken against management. A number of pressure groups
have sprung up to take suitable cases to court - the best known of these being
Stichting Onderzoek Bedrijfs Informatie represented by Mr. Pieter Lakeman. It
has been effective although it has lost many of its points.
About half the complaints made to the court are upheld. Some of the
complaints upheld by the court are particularly significant for accounting
regulations. For example, those quoted in a Dutch Institute publication
include: (1) the reason for a change in an accounting policy should be stated;
(2) outstanding contracts for the purchase/sale of inventories must be disclosed; and (3) a debit balance on a deferred tax account is not permitted [29].
The Attorney General of the Supreme Court has indicated [30] that the
Enterprise Chamber is not obliged to follow either the recommendations of the
Tripartite body or the International Accounting Standards, which are incorporated into the Tripartite body's recommendations.

4. Germany
In Germany, the role of the accounting profession with respect to shareholder protection differs from that in the U.K., U.S., and Holland. The U.K.,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

P.J. Rutteman / A ccounring regulations

Holland and the U.S. each have a substantial stock market and a history of
widespread equity investment. The U.K. and U.S. financial statements could
be said to be prepared primarily for the benefit of the shareholder - the equity
investor - whereas the Dutch would argue that U.S. and U.K. accounting are
obsessed with the shareholder interest and ignore the employee's interest. In
Germany, by contrast, the charge could be laid that the shareholder is
insufficiently considered. German business is largely financed by banks either
through loan capital or equity stock [31] on a basis that would be prohibited in
both the U.K. because of the City of Glasgow Bank crisis in the 1870s, and in
the U.S., given bank collapses during the Great Depression. German shareholders have bearer shares which traditionally are lodged, together with an
open proxy to vote, at the shareholders' banks. In essence, the banks wield the
power exercised by shareholders in other countries [32]. For instance, banks sit
on the supervisory board of major clients, given the German two-tier board
system. Banks tend to be more knowledgeable. There is less emphasis on the
income statement vis-h-vis the balance sheet as a result [33]. Because the
German system of law tends toward a system of interlocking disciplines, the
link between tax and accounting requirements is strong [34]. For example, the
amount of tax depreciation that can be claimed on different assets is regulated
by law so that such amounts can only be claimed if they are likewise included
in the financial statements [35]. In effect, therefore, the tax rules have an
enormous influence on accounting requirements and the tax authorities are
part of the supervisory process. Accounting tends to be very conservative both
because of the influence of the banks and because no one wishes to pay tax on
profits not yet realized in cash terms. The key principles, prudence and the
concept of lowest value, ensure that only realized profits can be included in the
income statements while all losses must immediately be recognized [36]. Thus,
the evenhanded approach to the treatment of currency gains and losses in
SFAS 52 [37], whereby some profits may be accounted for although not yet
realized, is acceptable in Germany. Since German law formed such a significant part of the model for the Fourth EEC Directive on Company Law [38] harmonizing accounts in Europe - this remains a major problem.
The accounting profession in Germany is small, some 4,000 Wirtschaftsprufer [39] compared with over 80,000 Chartered Accountants in the U.K. The
reason, in part, for the relatively small size of the German accounting profession is because a Wirtschaftsprufer who takes a job in industry ceases to be a
member. Since the profession cannot dictate standards to the preparers of
accounts, their influence is limited. Consequently, the government lays down
accounting principles in law. Some of them seem strange to British or American readers. For example, the law requires only domestic subsidiaries to be
consolidated [40].
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5. France
France is another country where the traditional source of finance for
industry has not been outside equity. Large French industry developed mainly
in family or state hands. The tax linkage is much the same as in Germany and
the French accounting profession has a similar problem in making its influence
felt in the setting of accounting standards. French accounting regulation has
traditionally been directed at tax collection and government planning [411. The
French inherited from Germany the structure of a uniform code of accounts as
a basis for macroeconomic planning and the appeal of standardized formats of
accounts remains. A government-appointed advisory body, the Conseil National de la Comptabilit , has put much effort into developing standard
accounts formats. It recommends the use of specific accounting principles and
pontificates on the acceptability of others. The capitalization of finance leases
in the financial statements of lessees, for example, would be unacceptable
because it would mean putting on balance sheet assets that are not owned. The
influence of lawyers, rather than accountants, is perhaps more strongly felt in
the Conseil National de la Comptabilit&.
In recent years, the French government has been keen to develop wider
share ownership and the Bourse, the French stock exchange, has been
strengthened. To encourage this, the government set up a regulatory body
called the Commission des Op6rations de Bourse (COB) [42] which has been
very effective in improving French accounting. The COB encourages the use of
consolidated accounts although it may only require them when companies
come to the market for new capital [431. It also has powers to require
companies to seek other auditors and has used those powers where it thought
the company was too large and complex for a small audit firm to handle.
Moreover, it has instituted inquiries into apparent accounting scandals and it
comments freely in its regular reports on improvements needed in French
accounting [44]. The COB, itself, is a very small team of three or four
government appointees, but its success lies in the individuals selected. Monsieur
Bertrand d'Illiers has gained an international reputation for his successful
efforts in developing French accounting practice in this way.

6. Italy
Similar accounting developments are underway in Italy. The Consob [45]
has been set up to improve investor confidence in Italian shares quoted on the
Milan stock exchange, an exchange which previously was said to be used only
by fools and insiders [46]! One of the first actions taken was required use of
International Accounting Standards [47]. That was an interim measure while
the main Italian accounting profession developed its own standards. Currently,
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Consob requires the use of those principles which have already been established by the Dottori Commercialisti [48] and of International Accounting
Standards where they have not. However, accounting regulation in Italy has
still to mature.

7. EEC
From this background it is obvious that harmonization [49] of accounting
requirements in the EEC is not an easy matter. The main steps, however, have
been taken. The Fourth Directive [50] on the accounts of individual companies,
and the Seventh Directive [51] on group accounts have already been agreed to
by the Council of Ministers. The Fourth Directive is already enacted in
national law in half of the member states [52]. The Seventh Directive must be
enacted by January 1, 1988, and must be effective by January 1, 1990.
These dates may give a clue to one of the disadvantages of regulation by
directive - the process is very slow and implementation takes place some years
after ultimate agreement. Nevertheless, there is a great need for harmonization
within Europe. Whereas most large U.S. corporations derive the greater part of
their sales and profits from U.S. sources, the larger U.K. and Dutch companies
have the majority of their operations abroad and other EEC-based companies
are expanding abroad rapidly. Increasingly, those operations are in other EEC
states and the U.S. In the longer term, a European stock exchange is desirable
where European companies' shares would be traded as domestic issues. To
achieve this, greater consistency of accounting principles and understanding of
accounts is needed. The Fourth Directive is the key and all member states will
have to introduce provisions in their national law implementing its requirements.
Norteworthy requirements include:
(i) Companies must comply with all the provisions of the Directive except
where there is an overriding requirement for the accounts to show a true and
fair view [53].
(ii) Accounts are to be prepared using standard formats. There are four
possible profit and loss account formats [54] and two balance sheet formats
[55].
(iii) Valuation rules are specified using the historical cost basis as the
normal basis of accounting. Provision is made for the use of various methods
or recognition of changing price levels if member states -wish to allow it [56].
(iv) The contents of the directors' report are specified and the scope of the
audit is extended to include an implicit assurance that the disclosure requirements for the accounts have been met and that the directors' report is not
inconsistent with the accounts [571.
It is clear, therefore, that historical cost is the normal basis of accounting.
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Although member states may permit recognition of the effects of inflation,
comparisons must always be made with the normal historical cost basis [58].
For the first time in the U.K., accounting principles are set out in law where
previously they had been contained in accounting standards [59]. In some
cases, the requirements of the law are more stringent. For example, in requiring
adherence to the concepts of consistency, accruals basis, going concern basis,
and prudence as general principles of valuation, it does no more than echo
existing standards. But, by detailing under the prudence basis that provision
must be made for all foreseeable losses while only realized profits may be
recognized in income, it has gone much further. Such restrictions are already
causing problems for the U.K. accounting profession. There are also more
specific valuation rules [60] dealing with the basis of charging depreciation, the
treatment of goodwill, and the valuation of inventories.
Overall, the Fourth Directive, viewed as a first step towards harmonized
accounting practice, has caused radical changes to the thinking and existing
practice in a number of Member States. The question has to be asked: "Would
it not have been better simply to adopt International Accounting Standards?
[61]" Unfortunately, International Accounting Standards are not considered an
acceptable basis for hamonization within the EEC by the Commission or
member governments, although admiration for the standards exists. The problem is simply that the International Accounting Standards are promulgated by
what is seen as a private body which is strongly influenced by British practice.
To be effective, harmonization must come about through directives developed
by the Commission and agreed to between governments of member states.
The effects, to date, have proven quite different from those expected. In
continental Europe, countries have been struggling with the concept of the true
and fair view [62] - how should it be defined in law? Will compliance with the
law not automatically result in a true and fair view? What departures from the
law can be authorized on the basis of such a nebulous concept? The "true and
fair view" concept is nothing new for the U.K., and others turned to the U.K.
to seek help in understanding the concept. Perhaps, the French have come
closest to our thinking with their "image fid6le."
In the U.K., the main difficulty lies in the interpretation of "realized
profits." A German view, and this part of the Fourth Directive is based on
German thinking, interprets the concept as meaning that a transaction must be
complete and the result known with certainty. In the U.K., "realized profits"
requires virtual certainty and, in certain cases, partial completion [63]. The
U.K., for example, allows use of the percentage of completion basis for
long-term contracts [64]. Interestingly, in Germany, this basis of accounting is
now becoming acceptable, although recognition of unrealized profit on foreign
currency transactions using an SFAS 52 approach would not be allowed [651.
Further discussion centers on the perceived purpose of the profit and loss
accounts. In the U.K., it principally serves as a reflection of a company's
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performance, while elsewhere it is seen as a statement of distributable trading
profits realized during the year.
Incorporation of the Fourth Directive's provisions in U.K. law has resulted
in a number of recent Accounting Standards resorting to the true and fair
override. An example is SSAP 19, which requires companies not to depreciate
buildings held for investment because to do so would conflict with the true and
fair view. The law requires all tangible fixed assets having a limited useful life
to be depreciated, which is why the true and fair view override has to be
invoked [66]. Needless to say, the EEC Commission is not very impressed with
the override: the Commission views the override as applicable to individual
companies in unusual circumstances and not of general application to general
situations. This strain between standard-setting bodies in member states and
the Commission, charged with ensuring proper application of EEC directives,
is only just emerging.
When the Directive was first adopted, a Contact Committee comprising
Commission staff and representatives of national governments was established
[67]. Its function is to interpret the Directive as necessary and recommend
changes where appropriate. So far, the Contact Committee has had only
limited success although a number of problems have been raised and discussed.
The difficulty lies in securing changes which would require further directives.
The accounting profession has an input to the directives through the Groupe
d'Etudes des Experts Comptables de la C.E.E. (EEC Accountants Study
Group) [68]. It has provided advice to the Commission at all stages in the
development of the Fourth Directive. It has also advised on similar directives
involving the accounts of banks and insurance companies.
Overall harmonization is a laudable goal but, given the very different
economic backgrounds of the member states and the different ways national
accounting systems have developed, it is questionable whether directives are
the best means of securing the necessary harmonization. The Fourth Directive
is a compromise, or series of compromises, of necessity at a relatively low level.
Further harmonization is needed, but Member States have expressed concern
over the number of new laws that must be introduced following adoption of
new directives. The process of preparing directives is too slow and the
mechanism needs to be improved. There needs to be greater exposure during
the negotiation process because, at present, the final directive often bears little
direct resemblance to the last publicly available proposal. For instance, the
Seventh Directive on group accounts changed completely during negotiations.
Increased use of experts in the negotiations must occur. Accountants, and not
just governmental officials, need to be involved. Finally, priorities need to be
more carefully set: sacrificing the complete coverage of annual accounts in one
directive, in favor of tackling only the problems that need to be dealt with
through a series of directives.
As for the lessons that may be drawn in the U.S., they are much the same as
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can be drawn elsewhere. While some regulation is needed, overregulation can
be both costly and ineffective. One point, however, does stand out. The EEC
Commission consciously treats the employee and the investor as equally
interested in the results of a company. In contrast, financial reporting in the
U.S. is seen as exclusively investor-oriented.

8. Additional models of accounting regulation
So what is the ideal system of accounting regulation? I find the Canadian
model attractive with its legal backing for private sector standard-setting.
Thus, the law requires that accounts must comply with generally accepted
accounting principles and then defines those as the principles promulgated by
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) [69. This combines
the enforceability of the law with the flexibility of standards set by a profession
in touch with current problems. Meanwhile, such regulatory bodies as the
Ontario Securities Commission ensure that the standards are applied without
having to be directly involved in setting them.
Australia is another interesting model, although it is more accurate to say
that the new Australian regulatory system is an amalgam of works used in the
U.K., the EEC, and the U.S. The regulatory body, the National Companies
and Securities Commission (NCSC), was established following adoption of the
1979 Securities Act [70]. It is one half of the cooperative scheme established
among the six states to ensure that companies and securities regulation is
uniform throughout the Commonwealth of Australia. The Ministerial Council
for Companies and Securities is the other half of the scheme. The NCSC
performs its regulatory function by reviewing and agreeing to standards that
the profession prepares. The nine-person review body has the power of veto in
that if it does not agree with a proposed standard, the standard may be sent
back to the profession for revision. This also has the effect of strengthening the
standards and making them enforceable.
In Japan, the state takes responsibility for accounting regulation and, as in
some parts of Europe, accounting and tax regulation are closely related.
Individual accounts are accorded greater significance in the tax regime than
consolidated accounts and it appears that only some fifty percent of listed
companies currently publish consolidated accounts [71]. Japan has some way
to go before it can be considered a model of accounting regulation, but there
are changes afoot and much greater interest is currently accorded the International Accounting Standards.
It is the International Accounting Standards that will gain increased importance in the future. In the U.S., the existence of conflicting accounting
requirements in different countries is of only minor importance. Most U.S.
companies derive the greater part of their earnings, and hold most of their
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assets, in their home market. But for U.K., Dutch, Canadian and, increasingly,
Australian, Japanese and other European companies, the greater part of
companies' income is earned abroad and the differences in accounting requirements pose significant obstacles. International Accounting Standards hold out
a greater hope for harmonization than any consensus among other regulations.
Generally, International Accounting Standards are seen to be well thought
out and technically competent. They are widely disseminated and discussed
and are the result of truly international debate. The difficulty is that the IASC
has no jurisdiction of its own and has to rely on its members using their best
efforts to persuade local regulators to adopt the IASC requirements [72]. These
efforts have had only limited success. It is not just the SEC and the FASB that
argue that their domestic responsibilities are much more important than
international harmonization. Nor is it realistic to believe that all countries will
simply adopt the FASB standards.
Both the U.N. and the OECD have tried to deal with this difficulty in
different ways. The OECD, in particular, is making a significant contribution
by bringing together standard-setters. The country representatives are usually
government officials - but Canada is represented by a CICA staff member and
the U.S. is represented by Clarence Staubs of the SEC and Richard Walters,
ex-FASB member - who gather to discuss papers on topics such as foreign
currency translation, deferred tax, and accounts of banks and insurance
companies [73]. While useful as a discussion forum, the OECD is unlikely to
achieve significant harmonization since no one is keen to see yet another
standard-setting body emerge.
Similar to the OECD, the U.N. Committee on Transnationals [74] is a
discussion forum. Its annual meetings last two weeks at a time. It has a wider
membership than the OECD and the issues have a greater political content
than discussions at the OECD. In that no harmonization can be achieved
without a suitable forum for discussion, the U.N. and the OECD serve a useful
purpose, although concrete results will take a long while to achieve.
To summarize, the level of accounting regulation is related to the economic
environment of each country. It may be that the U.S. needs greater regulation
than other countries, but international companies, generally, suffer from the
plethora of conflicting regulations. Perhaps the time is ripe for a more
international view of accounting regulation. Initially, harmonization must
occur through development of broad principles and not through cookbook
rules. That can come later, if it is needed at all. Surely, it is worth asking
whether we can do without a regulation, given the economic costs of conflicting national accounting standards, rather than just how we shall precisely word
the requirement. Indeed, could we not live without a standard reporting a
change in accounting for railroad track structures?
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